Price in Missouri is 'monstrous'

It is not surprising that "Union" Major General Samuel Ryan Curtis who commanded the Department of Kansas is 1864 would state that, "The idea of Price being anywhere in Missouri is monstrous! To those Missourians of the "northern persuasion" and there were a great many during the Civil War this was true! However, to those of the "southern persuasion" in the Show-Me-State this was heresy, because the second coming of Major General Sterling Price and his "Army of Missouri," hopefully, would liberate them from northern oppression and aggression! Alas, in retrospect Price's 1864 Campaign in Missouri and Kansas did not liberate Missouri from its' northern occupation and oppression. In fact, it created much hardship and suffering in both Missouri and Kansas and that is the reality of war, any war.

On Sept. 27, 1864, Price's "Army of Missouri" participated in the first major battle of this campaign at a place called Pilot Knob or Fort Davidson in extreme southeast Missouri. This was a Union victory but on the following day because of the overwhelming Confederate force the "Yankees" were forced to evacuate Fort Davidson and retreat towards Rolla. The following correspondence describes concern for Price's Army from and the Confederate threat to Kansas and an abbreviated after action report describing the "Battle of Pilot Knob or Fort Davidson". The correspondence is located on Pages 426 and 427 in Series I, Vol. 41, Part III, Correspondence and the after action report is located on Pages 448 and 449, Part I, Reports in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion.

St. Louis, Mo., Sept. 27, 1864

Maj. Gen. S. R. Curtis,

Leavenworth:

Price is probably at PILOT KNOB this morning! The same urgency that induced you to ask the retention of other troops here in the Marmaduke Raid and in recommending which I joined you, was the cause of the request submitted yesterday.

Respectfully,

B. Gratz Brown

Fort Leavenworth, Sept. 27, 1864

Hon. B. Gratz Brown, St. Louis, Mo.:

My response to your dispatch was more responsive to former dispatches from others than from you. I am advised that Brown at Warrensburg has an ample force to relieve Ford and allow me to put in advance such a force as I may wield against the foe in our common front. The idea of Price being anywhere in Missouri is mostrous!

S. R. Curtis, Major General, Commanding.

(Abbreviated "after action" report of Brigadier Gen. Thomas Ewing Jr., Union commanding officer during the Battle of Pilot Knob or Fort Davidson, Mo. on Sept. 27, 1864.)

Headquarters St. Louis District, Oct. 20, 1864.

We still held with the skirmishers, the sides of Shepherd Mountain except the gap and side of Pilot Knob not raked by their artillery. The division on Shepherd's Mountain was Marmaduke's, which, on the withdrawal of the white flag and the opening of their artillery, moved rapidly down to the assault, his line greatly broken by the rugged and steep descent and by our fire, which told with marked effect upon them. On reaching the plain most of the assaulting force took cover in the deep bed of the creek, from which they opened and kept up an incessant fire. About 100 ventured on to assault but fell or were driven back before they reached the ditch.

Almost simultaneously with the movement of Marmaduke's division, that of General Fagan moved over Pilot Knob in stronger force and less disturbed by our fire sweeping back in disorder or cutting off our companies which held the town and part of the mountain sides. His lines were greatly broken by the houses and fences of the skirt of town, but were hastily reformed by him and by General Cabell, who led the assault and swept upon the plain in handsome style, yelling and on the double quick. We opened on them when at 600 yards from the fort with musketry from the ramparts and from the long line of north rifle-pits and with canister from seven pieces of artillery. They rushed on most gallantly, but were broken, confused and swept down by our rapid and well directed fire until the advance reached the ditch, when the attacking forces fled in dismay, leaving apparently almost half of their comrades dead or wounded on the plain. Pending the assaults the enemy threw a large cavalry force around the west end of Shepherd's Mountain to occupy the road north of us to Mineral Point. As they moved along the base of Cedar Mountain just after the last assault was repulsed, a sortie was made from the north ditch by which they were routed and lost considerably. A half hour of ineffective musketry and artillery firing ended the engagement with the approach of night.

I knew that the next morning the enemy having possession of the mountain tops and sides would place all artillery in position to command the fort, which would make it certainly untenable. I therefore determined to evacuate that night. The chief danger was that the preparations for the retreat might be observed and the garrison cut to pieces or captured in the confusion incident to the exit. But, with all its dangers the policy of retreat was clearly best and preparations for it began at midnight. I had Col. Fletcher arrange for having the magazine (which was large and filled with every variety of ammunition) blown in two hours after we left or as soon as our exit should be discovered by the enemy. We took possession of the town and valley and drove from them all straggling rebels. The garrison was then aroused, knapsacks packed, haversacks and cartridge boxes well supplied and everything destructible, which we could not take away and the enemy might use was placed near or on the magazine.

At 3 o'clock Col. Fletcher silently led the infantry out of the sally port around the ditch and through the north rifle pit, forming them under cover of a deep shadow at the end of the pit. The drawbridge was then covered with tents to muffle the sound and the cavalry and battery marching out formed column with the infantry and took a by way to the Potosi Road. The body of the rebel army were busy making fascines and scaling ladders for an assault in the morning. They even failed to take the hint (of our evacuation) when the magazine, an hour before daylight, shook the hills with its explosion.

Our loss at Pilot Knob was about 200 killed, wounded and missing and in the several engagements on the retreat to Rolla about 150.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

Thomas Ewing Jr.

Brigadier General, Commanding.

So ended the Battle of Pilot Knob and the Union evacuation of Fort Davidson. In eastern Kansas there was a concern about where Price and his "Army of Missouri" were going, but even at the end of September in 1864 a more immediate threat was from the Confederate forces in the "Indian Territory" (present Oklahoma) and the Yankee's constant nemesis, the bushwhackers of Missouri, as noted in the following correspondence.

Fort Scott, Kan., Sept. 27, 1864.

Maj. Gen. S. R. Curtis

Fort Leavenworth, Kan.:

I have just received the following letter from General Thayer. If you wish a copy of the dispatch to General Halleck, therein referred to, I will telegraph it to you:

Headquarters District of the Frontier, Fort Smith, Ark., Sept. 22, 1864

Colonel: Before this reaches you, you will have heard of the capture of the train. You will please forward by telegraph a copy of the enclosed dispatch to Major General Halleck and send the original by mail. No train should be forwarded to Fort Gibson until you hear further from me.

John M. Thayer, Brigadier General Commanding.

C. W. Blair, Colonel, Commanding, Fort Scott

Fort Scott, Sept. 27, 1864

Major General Curtis,

General Thayer requests that no train be sent until he sends further word. Thinks he will have to evacuate Forts Gibson and Smith unless he gets re-enforcements.

My messenger killed by bushwhackers en route for Fort Gibson 25 miles (south) from here. Train will not move till further orders.

C. R. Jennison m Colonel, Commanding 2nd Ks. Sub-District

Fort Leavenworth, Sept. 27, 1864.

Major General Sykes, Lawrence:

Letter of 22nd from General Thayer desires that no train be sent through until further news from him.

Another from Col. Adams, Commandant, Fort Gibson, says we must guard trains against 5,000. There is an (enemy) force of 1,500 at Cane Hill."

S. R. Curtis, Major General.

Eventually, in the fall of 1864, Forts Gibson and Smith, were re-enforced so the forts did not have to be evacuated, General Price and his "Army of Missouri" continued their campaign in Missouri, invaded Kansas and threatened Fort Scott as the war went on!